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THE ASPHALT CLAUSE-A NEW WEAPON IN
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
BERNARD I. KAPLAN*
In October, 1960, the words "asphalt clause" were added to anti-
trust terminology. This phrase is the appellation of a potentially
powerful weapon for future enforcement of the Sherman Ace—the
basic antitrust statute. The term "asphalt clause" refers to a specific
provision in a consent decree' terminating a civil antitrust case brought
by the federal government. The clause provides that the decree shall
have a specified prima fade effect in favor of the plaintiffs in certain
subsequent private treble damage actions for the same violation. Its
existence is the result of administrative and judicial, rather than con-
gressional action. This article will discuss the origin of the asphalt
clause, some of the problems it raises, and its likely effect.
Recovery of damages by private parties is an integral part of any
truly effective policy of antitrust enforcement.' Congress has specifi-
cally provided in Section 4 of the Clayton Act:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may
sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold the damages
by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee'
* A.B. 1937, LL.B. 1940, Harvard University; Mass. Asst Att'y Gen., Antitrust
Division ; Partner in the firm of Kaplan & Kaplan, Boston ; Instructor, Antitrust and
Trade Regulation, Boston University ; Member, A.B.A. Comin. on State Antitrust
Laws.
1 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. H 1, 2 (1958). This article deals
primarily with § 1:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal . . .
2 For a general survey of antitrust consent decrees, see Phillips, The Consent
Decree in Antitrust Enforcement, 18 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 39 (1961).
3 The private antitrust suit blends antitrust policy with private compensatory
law: on the one hand . . . such suits aim to enlist "the business public ..
as allies of the Government in enforcing the antitrust laws"; the means chosen,
on the other hand, is to give "the injured party ample recompense for the
wrong suffered" by allowing threefold recovery of damages.
Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws 378
(1955) ; hereinafter cited as Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep.
"The private antitrust suit is a curious combination of public regulatory and
private compensating law." Comment, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties:
Analysis of Developments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 Yale L.J. 1010, 1011 (1952).
4 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
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To aid such litigation, section 5(a) of the Clayton Act provides:
A final judgment or decree . . . rendered in any civil or
criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United
States under the antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant
has violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence against
such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any
other party against such defendant under said laws . . . as
to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would
be an estoppel as between the parties thereto: Provided, This
section shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees en-
tered before any testimony has been taken . . . . 5
Thus, the private plaintiff may use to his advantage a final judg-
ment or litigated decree obtained by the federal government in a prior
proceeding dealing with the same conspiracy. However, a nob con-
tendere plea accepted by the court in a criminal case, or a consent
decree entered by the court' in a civil case, has no such prima facie
effect.' As a practical matter, the negotiation of consent decrees has
been confined to discussions between the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice and the defendant, subject to the court's final
approval of the decree presented to it"
Any discussion of the asphalt clause is rendered more fruitful by
reviewing some past activity in the use of private actions for damages
arising out of violations of the antitrust laws. First, despite the liberal
provisions for treble damages, costs, and attorney's fees, private anti-
trust suits were but sparingly initiated until 1940. Since then, there
has been a steady increase in the number of such suits.° Secondly,
and of special significance, successful termination of private treble
damage actions seems to have been largely dependent upon the exist-
ence of the prima facie case afforded by a prior government judgment
or decree.' The basic reason for this dependence has been the diffi-
5 38 Stat. 731, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 16(a) (1958).
6 Phillips, supra note 2, at 41. The court can withhold its assent. United States v.
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep. (1959 Trade Cas.) if 69,300 (S.D.N.Y.
1959).
7 See statute cited note 5 supra; see also Comment, 61 Yale L.J. 1010, 1040 & n.203
(1952). However, there is authority for the proposition that a conviction based on a
nolo contendere plea may be used as evidence to impeach a witness. See Pfotzer v.
Aqua Systems, Inc., 162 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1947).
8 McHenry, The Asphalt Clause—A Trap for the Unwary, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1114,
1117-18 (1961).
See Comment, 61 Yale L.J. 1010, 1011 (1952) ; and Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm.
Antitrust Rep. 378.
10 . 1P3rivate suits generally are not brought until the government wins a
suit against a violator, after which the private plaintiff can not only take ad-
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culty of proving the claim for such damages. To prove his claim, the
plaintiff must establish three elements: (a) that there was a violation
of the statute, e.g., a conspiracy in restraint of trade;" (b) that he
was damaged in his business or property by the violation; 12 and (c) the
extent to which he was so damaged." It is a fact of life in antitrust
litigation that the first step, proof of a violation, is almost always a
costly, time-consuming and difficult matter. It is generally recognized
that in many situations only the federal government has the resources
and the competency for the full investigation and analysis on which
to base proof of a violation of the antitrust laws." While the courts
have been liberal in the standards of proof they require to establish
the fact and extent of damage: 5 the plaintiff must still meet the rig-
orous standards of proof of the violation itself." Thirdly, it has been
decided that a public body is a private person within the meaning of
Sections 4 and 5 of the Clayton Act."
It was against this background that the asphalt clause emerged.
In August and October, 1959, the United States filed criminal and
civil antitrust actions against a number of defendants for alleged price-
fixing and bid-rigging in the sale of asphalt, road tar, and bituminous
concrete to governmental bodies in the New England area." Principal
victims appeared to be the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and many
of its cities and towns. In the criminal cases, which are normally
disposed of before the consideration of consent decrees: 9 the defend-
vantage of Section 5 of the Clayton Act, but can also rely on the successful
legal theory developed in the government's case.
Clark, The Treble Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Damages in Private Antitrust
Suits, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 363 (1954). See also McHenry, supra note 8, at 1116 & n.10.
11 See Comment, 61 Yale L.J. 1010, 1011-16 (1952).
12 Id. at 1016-21.
13 Id. at 1022-26.
14 Bicks, Antitrust Today, 1961 N.Y. State BA. Antitrust Law Symposium 15, 19:
But, often a state or city may not have the resources to investigate and prove
the antitrust conspiracy from which the damages stemmed .. . . In these cir-
cumstances . . the primary responsibility for securing an adjudication of
liability may devolve on the federal government.
15 See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946); see also
Comment, 61 Yale L.J. 1010, 1016-22, 1026 (1952).
15 See Comment, 61 Yale L.J. 1010, 1011-16 (1952).
17 Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942). This was another case involving a
violation of the Sherman Act in the sale of asphalt to a state.
15 United States v. Bituminous Concrete Ass'n, Cr. No. 59-165-M (D. Mass.
1959) ; United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., Cr. No. 59-166-M (D. Mass. 1959) ; United
States v Lake Asphalt & Petroleum Co., Cr. No. 59-167-M (D. Mass. 1959)—Cases
1472, 1473 and 1474, Trade Reg. Rep. (10th ed.) (Cases Instituted) ¶ 45,059.
United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., Civ, No. 59-784-M (D. Mass. 1959) ; United
States v. Bituminous Concrete Ass'n, Civ. No. 59-785-M (D. Mass. 1959) ; United
States v. Lake Asphalt & Petroleum Co., Civ. No. 59-786-M (D. Mass. 1959)—Cases
1480, 1481 and 1482, Trade Reg. Rep. (10th ed.) (Cases Instituted) fl 45,059.
19 McHenry, supra note 8, at 1118.
357
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
ants sought to change their original pleas of not guilty to nolo con-
tendere. At this point, AttorneyGeneral Edward J. McCormack, Jr.
of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts sought to appear in opposi-
tion to the acceptance of such pleas." The nolo pleas were accepted
and fines totalling 466,000 dollars were imposed.' Attorney General
McCormack then directed his attention to the negotiation for consent
decrees which were being carried on between the Antitrust Division
and the defendants. In a letter to United States Attorney General
William P. Rogers, he urged that some protective provisions for the
injured public bodies be included in any consent decree that might
be entered. He stated that "to accept a nolo plea in a criminal case
and then a consent decree in a civil action completely destroys for all
intents and purposes the rights of the treble damage litigant which,
in this case, happens to be sister-governments, i.e., the State of Massa-
chusetts and the cities and towns therein! He maintained that "in
accepting nolo pleas and consent decrees—the greatest deterrent to
antitrust is being vitiated and the effectiveness of enforcement
weakened."23 Assistant Attorney General Robert Bicks, head of the
Antitrust Division, gave the matter serious consideration. In the
meantime, on April 1, 1960, McCormack filed treble damage suits on
behalf of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.' In October, 1960,
a decree was entered containing the asphalt clause:
. . . [D]efendants signatory hereto having admitted the
allegations contained in the Government's complaint herein
solely for the purpose and to the extent necessary to give to
zo The court did not allow the Commonwealth to argue on the ground that it was
not a party. Stenographic Record 9-10.
21 Cases 1472, 1473 and 1474, .cited note 18 supra. In accepting the nolo pleas,
the court recognized that the federal government still had civil suits pending. Steno-
graphic Record 21-22. A similar sentiment was expressed in United States v. Cigarette
Merchandisers Ass'n, 136 F. Supp. 212, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1955): ". . (Ulpon the further
assumption that the Attorney General will proceed with trial of the civil action, consent
is granted to the acceptance of the pleas of nolo contendere. . . ."
22 Letter From Massachusetts Attorney General Edward J. McCormack, Jr., to
United States Attorney General William P. Rogers, Feb. 13, 1960.
23 Statement of Massachusetts Attorney General McCormack at Antitrust and
Consumer Protection Conference, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., March 10,
1960.
24 Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Bituminous Concrete Ass'n, Civ. No. 60-227-S
(D. Mass. 1960); Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Allied Chem. Corp., Civ. No. 60-
228-S (D. Mass. 1960) ; Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Lake Asphalt & Petroleum
Co., Civ. No. 60-229-S (D. Mass. 1960).
Suits were later filed by the Attorney General on behalf of a number of Massachu-
setts cities and towns. The applicability of the prima facie effect of the consent judge-
ment to these suits is as yet undetermined. See McHenry, supra note 8, at 1119 n.18.
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the following adjudication the prima facie effect stated in
Section I below in the suits specified below, and for no other
purpose. . . .
That on the basis of said limited admission the defend-
ants . . . have engaged in an unlawful combination and
conspiracy in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act .. .
this adjudication being for the sole purpose of establishing
the prima fade effect of this Final Judgment, in the suits
specified below, and for no other purpose. . . .
Each defendant is enjoined . . . from denying that this
Final Judgment has such prima facie effect in any such suit.
. . . The specified suits . . . are the suits instituted in this
Court by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts . . . and
any other suit instituted by any Massachusetts city or town
against any of the defendants signatory hereto prior to the
date of entry of this Final Judgment . . . 25
Evaluation of this new weapon in antitrust enforcement must
rest at least in part, on the answer to two questions: First, is its use
consistent with the policy of enforcement expressed by Congress?
Secondly, is it an effective, fair and practical method of enforcement?
Enforcement of Section 1 of the Sherman Act takes its cue from
the character of the statute. Couched in general terms, it has been
compared to a constitutional provision." Its general objective is the
"promotion of competition in open markets!" 27
 Its essential standard
is reasonableness." Adaptability to new developments and new needs
is a chief source of its strength.2° Congress has recognized the desira-
bility of a variety of methods for administering and enforcing the
antitrust laws. There are statutory provisions for criminal sanctions,
civil actions by the federal government, private remedies with govern-
mental help, and administrative action. 8° The courts, in turn, have
25 United States v. Lake Asphalt & Petroleum Co., Trade Reg. Rep. (1960 Trade
Cas.) 11 69,835, at 77,272 (D. Mass. 1960). See McHenry, supra note 8, at 1119 n.18,
for a different disposition as to the two defendants. The bituminous concrete and road
tar cases were terminated with similar decrees. United States v. Allied Chem. Corp.,
Trade Reg. Rep. (1961 Trade Cas.) 9 69,923 (D. Mass. 1960) ; United States v. Bitumi-
nous Concrete Ass'n, Trade Reg. Rep. (1960 Trade Cas.) 9 69,878 (D. Mass. 1960).
26 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).
27 Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 1.
28 Supra note 26, at 360.
25 See Arnold, Economic Purpose of the Antitrust Laws, 26 Miss. L.J. 207, 210
(1955).
88 See Loevinger, The Free Enterprise System 223 (1949).
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allowed wide latitude in discovery proceedings' and in proof of
damages.32
Private suits for treble damages have always been regarded as
one of the strongest methods of securing compliance with the Sherman
Act" and as an integral part of enforcement policy. 34
 "As between
enforcement action by government agencies and by private parties,
there are a number of reasons to believe that action by private parties
is both more desirable and more effective."" Successful private ac-
tions for recovery of damages add a large and badly needed enforce-
ment tool, are more flexible and less authoritarian than solely federal
action, and repair to some extent the injury done. 3° Perhaps of greater
importance, the recovery of damages, more than any other means of
enforcement, cancels the gains received from the violation and thereby
minimizes the incentive to violate." The motivation for a conspiracy
in restraint of trade is essentially financial. A financial penalty would
thus seem to be an essential deterrent and, in some circumstances,
afford a stronger therapeutic effect than criminal penalty or injunctive
relief."
Sections 4 and 5 of the Clayton Act constitute a statutory recog-
nition of these considerations." However, the effectiveness of private
actions in enforcement policy depends upon the degree of success
enjoyed by the plaintiffs in such actions. Success of the plaintiffs, in
turn, depends very often upon the availability of a prima facie case
from prior governmental proceedings.' The antitrust plaintiff is faced
31 Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 16 F.R.D. 583, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1954);
Banana Service Co. v. United Fruit Co., 15 F.R.D. 106 (D. Mass. 1953).
32 Bigelow v. RKO, supra note 15.
33 See Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751 (1947); Com-
ment, 61 Yale L.J. 1010, 1011, 1061 (1952); Neale, The Antitrust Laws of the U.S.A.
388 (1960).
34 Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 378.
36 Loevinger, Private Action—The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 Antitrust Bull.
167, 168 (1958).
36 Ibid.
34 Id. at 168-69. For a discussion of the deterrent effects on corporate officials
personally, see Whiting, Antitrust and the Corporate Executive, 47 Va. L. Rev. 929
(1961). It is assumed that the real objective of enforcement is prevention rather than
punishment.
38 See Comment, 61 Yale L.J. 1010, 1061 (1952); Loevinger, supra note 36, at 168.
29 Congressional reports and debates on the proposal which ultimately became
$ 5 reflect a purpose to minimize the burdens of litigation for injured private
suitors by making available to them all matters previously established by the
Government in antitrust actions.
Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 568 (1951).
4° See Comment, 61 Yale L.J. 1010, 1060 (1952).
360
THE ASPHALT CLAUSE
with a burdensome problem of proof," and the prima facie case helps
to overcome this hardship."
Since the asphalt clause has reference to recovery of damages
by states and municipalities, its significance as an enforcement tool
is tied to the amount of use it is given by such bodies. An increasing
volume of purchases by all governmental agencies is apparent. In
1960, state and local governments purchased goods and services
amounting to 14.8 billion dollars and 32 billion dollars, respectively.'
It follows that the prevention and elimination of restraints of trade in
this area of the market place are vital to the maintenance of a free
competitive system." While the states and municipalities are public
bodies, they, like other non-federal litigants, feel the need for a prima
facie case." Its availability increases the probability that they will
take steps to recover their damages; its absence acts as a discouraging
factor, leading to inaction.
An important by-product to the encouragement given the states
by an asphalt clause is increased state antitrust activity. In recent
years, state use (in actions for damages) of both federal and state
antitrust laws has been recognized as essential to a comprehensive anti-
trust program for the country." The resources of the Antitrust Divi-
sion of the Department of Justice are limited. Many restraints, because
they are primarily of local impact, are more appropriately dealt with on
a state, rather than a federal level," and those not in interstate com-
merce must be reached on a state level, if they are to be reached at
all." A truly effective national enforcement program must reach these
local and intrastate restraints as well as those of broader impact."
41 Loevinger, The Free Enterprise System 248 (1949); Neale, op. cit. supra note 33,
at 388-89; 51 Cong. Rec. 1964 (1914).
42 Ibid.; Wham, Antitrust Treble-Damage Suits: The Government's Chief Aid in
Enforcement, 40 A.B.A.J. 1061 (1954).
48 H.R. Rep. No. 989, 87th Cong., 1st Sess 4-5 (1961).
44 Bicks, Antitrust Goals and Current Enforcement Programs, 15 U. Miami L. Rev.
225, 230 (1961).
45 McHenry, supra note 8, at 1114 n.2; Bicks, supra note 14; text accompanying
note 22 supra.
46 For a discussion of state antitrust activity, see series of articles in 39 Texas
L. Rev. (1961).
47 See statement by George A. Reycraft, Chief of Section Operations, Antitrust
Division, Department of Justice, at Antitrust and Consumer Protection Conference,
Washington, D.C., Nov. 13, 1961; Bicks, supra note 44, at 231.
48 Stern, A Proposed Uniform State Antitrust Law: Text and Commentary On a
Draft Statute, 39 Texas L. Rev. 717 (1961).
40 . . . [A] balanced enforcement program should include national and local
restraints within the reach of Federal antitrust. Industry wide and regional
proceedings, of course, play a crucial enforcement role. However, the importance
of striking down "local" restraints within the reach of the commerce clause is
not to be minimized. Such market clogs may be of great importance to the
people and the economy of a particular area, Often these restraints, carried out
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There are also other advantages of state antitrust activity. It
leads to a healthy diversity of approach, which is a recognized ad-
vantage of the federal system; it alsO stimulates exchange of informa-
tion among federal and state governments, thus promoting more effi-
cient detection and analysis of restraints." The asphalt clause has
been called the "most dramatic single step taken to encourage state
antitrust activity."'" Cooperation between the federal and state gov-
ernments since Attorney General McCormack's appeal to the Anti-
trust Division has been increasing.'
As against such advantages for effective antitrust enforcement,
what disadvantages are likely to accompany the asphalt clause?" Of
primary significance is the effect on the use of consent decrees. The
consent decree is a handy device for expediting settlement of cases."
Its true value, however, depends on whether it removes the abuses for
which the action was brought, and on whether it acts as an adequate
deterrent against future violations." Obviously, no statistical con-
clusions can be drawn from only one experience; but defendants
by small concerns without experienced antitrust counsel, are of a flagrant type
which antitrust compliance has largely removed from national markets. Since
State antitrust laws, with few exceptions, have not been fully developed or
enforced, national antitrust policy must make adequate provision for dealing
with all market restraints within its ambit.
Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 349.
5° Reycraft, supra note 47. It is significant that antitrust laws had their ante-
cedents in state decisions and statutes.- See Wilson, The State Antitrust Laws, 47 A.B.A.J.
160 (1961).
51 Sieker, The Role of the States in Antitrust Law Enforcement—Some Views and
Observations, 39 Texas L. Rev. 873, 874 (1961).
52 On November 13 and 14, 1961, all state Attorneys General were invited to a
National Conference on Antitrust Problems and Consumer and Investor Protection at
the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. Some topics discussed were: Antitrust
Problems; A Federal-State-Local Program for Reporting of Identical Bids; Recent
State Legislation Relative to Federal Programs; and Developing an Antitrust Damage
Claim.
On April 12, 1961, Presidential Executive Order No. 10936 (26 Fed. Reg. 3555)
invited state cooperation in the reporting of identical bids. The "electrical" cases
[Cases 1496-1508, 1517-30, 1539-42, 1548-51, 1556 and 1567 Trade Reg. Rep. (10th ed.)
(Cases Instituted) II 45,060] also contributed greatly to the impetus for cooperation.
There does not appear to be any problem of federal pre-emption of the antitrust field.
See Stern, supra note 51; and Rahl, Toward a Worthwhile State Antitrust Policy, 39
Texas L. Rev. 753, 756-57 (1961) ; see also statement by the Head of the Department
of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel to Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee, Trade Reg. Rep. No. 26, March 12, 1962.
53 See McHenry, supra note 8.
54 Phillips, supra note 2, at 42.
If the government obtains the same or similar relief by means of a consent
settlement, not only can time and funds be saved by all concerned, including
the public, but undesirable practices in an industry can be quickly curtailed.
Id. at 46.
55 Comment, 55 Mich. L. Rev. 92 (1956). For a critical analysis of the effectiveness
of consent decrees, see Phillips, supra note 2.
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will undoubtedly be more reluctant to enter into a consent decree
with an asphalt clause than without one. It has been pointed out that
the insistence on an asphalt clause would have particular relevance in
a close case." Ordinarily, in a close case, defendants may be willing to
enter into a consent decree to save the time and expense of prepara-
tion and trial, and the publicity attendant on trial. If, however, an
asphalt clause is to be included, defendants, anticipating subsequent
treble damage actions, may well decide to run the risk of litigation
with the possibility of complete or partial vindication. This may lead
to fewer consent decrees and more protracted litigation in cases
initiated by the federal government but in which the defendants
nevertheless are convinced that they have a good chance of winning.
If the defendants, however, do recognize that the government has a
strong case, they may feel that even an asphalt clause is preferable to
the expense of trial, and the probability of private damage actions re-
sulting from the attendant added publicity, and full disclosure of the
evidence. The problem is thus avoided if the use of the asphalt clause
is confined to strong government cases.
If, on the other hand, the insistence on an asphalt clause by the
Antitrust Division does lead to more litigation of government civil
suits, such a result does not mean that the asphalt clause should not
be used. The ultimate test of a consent decree is whether it will
benefit the public. The question is whether, in the particular case
under consideration, the public interest is best served by insistence
on an asphalt clause. If the considered judgment of the Antitrust
Division is that the public interest in enforcement of the antitrust laws
demands an asphalt clause, the resultant burden on the courts must
be faced and solved without sacrificing antitrust enforcement activity."
In fact, the argument has been made that "the Court's resources would
seem best spared by contest of the liability issue in the federal case—
where evidence is already together and experienced antitrust litigators
more likely."58
A further objection to the asphalt clause may be that the federal
government is taking positive steps to further the collection of damages
by a certain favored class of litigants," i.e., public bodies. First, it
must be recognized that a prima facie case by no means hands damages
56 McHenry, supra note 8, at 1123.
57
 In United States v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co.. 137 F. Supp. 167, 172
(S.D.N.Y. 1955), the court recogmized that the judgment of the Attorney General is an
important element to be considered in deciding whether to accept a nolo contendere
plea.
58
 Ricks, Significant New Antitrust Developments, 17 A.B.A. Antitrust Section 268,
271 (1960).
58
 McHenry, supra note 8, at 1125.
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to the state or municipality on a silver platter. The burden of proof
of all three elements is still on the plaintiff, who thus faces formidable
obstacles despite the effect of the asphalt clause as a prima facie case
on the issue of the existence of a violation.' Secondly, states and
municipalities, while "persons" within the meaning of the Clayton Act,
are not really private parties. The damages they sustain and the re-
covery they obtain, do not contribute to private loss or private gain.
An additional area of concern may be in the lack of standards
governing the insistence of the Antitrust Division on an asphalt
clause,' Defendants may properly argue that looseness in application
will result in some defendants being subjected to asphalt clauses while
others are not, because of different enforcement policies by the federal
authorities at different times. To date, the Antitrust Division has
attempted to meet this criticism by indicating the guides it will use in
determining whether to insist on an asphalt clause. In an address
shortly before the entry of the asphalt clause, Mr. Bicks suggested:
. . . [T]here [are] four limiting factors to be considered
with regard to the new policy: (1) the "primary brunt" of the
violations must have been borne by very few states; (2) the
asphalt clause should run only to states and their political
subdivisions; (3) the state or other entity must have filed a
damage action or indicated an intent to do so; and (4) even
when the above three factors are present an asphalt clause
might not always be appropriate. 82
Again in an address in 1961, he stated:
In this area we have conducted and are conducting a
number of experiments aimed at preserving for injured cities
and states the benefits they could secure through an adjudi-
cation of liability pursuant to Section 5 of the Clayton Act.
In the New England road paving cases, where we had been
less successful in opposing nolo pleas, we were able in the
companion civil cases to obtain litigated judgments or con-
sent decrees which, in addition to restoring competitive con-
ditions, could be used by the states and local governments
who had brought damage actions as proof of the conspiracy.
As I indicated, this program has been experimental in
6° See Comment, 61 Yale L.J. 1010, 1040, 1055-56 (1952). For a discussion of limita-
tions on the use of prior government decrees in subsequent treble damage actions, see
Timberlake, The Use of Government Judgments or Decrees in Subsequent Treble Damage
Action Under the Antitrust Laws, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 991 (1961).
In McHenry, supra note 8, at 1124-25.
62 Id. at 1120-21.
364
THE ASPHALT CLAUSE
nature and has been limited to cases where the focus of the
conspiracy was the states and municipalities less able to
fend for themselves in damage actions but willing and able
to commence such proceedings and prosecute them to the
limits of their resources. Thus primarily benefiting in the
• New England road paving cases was the State of Massachu-
setts, and a number of its subdivisions which had filed
damages actions prior to final resolution of the civil case.
And the States of California and Wisconsin have similarly
filed damages actions in the "bleachers" cases where we are
also insisting that we will agree to a consent decree only if
it adequately protects State interests.
Our aim has been cooperation, not assumption of the
duties and responsibilities of our coordinate sovereignties.
But we have felt that one of the factors properly to be con-
sidered by the Department of Justice and the courts alike in
determining whether consent decrees should be accepted is
the impact of any such acceptance upon the practical ability
of the states and municipalities to secure recompense for the
losses suffered by their citizenry. Protected by such proce-
dure is a defendant's right to a day in court on any and all
issues. He is free to contest via trial the issue of antitrust
liability. He is free, if he chooses, to try out the fact and
extent of damage to States or Cities. But if a defendant
chooses to litigate his antitrust liability, he must do so in the
context of the federal proceeding—where evidence is already
garnered and legal issues are familiar to enforcement officials.
Thus we seek to make effective the right granted by Congress
to the States to secure appropriate recompense."
If the use of the asphalt clause is limited to the area and cir-
cumstances suggested by these statements, it is entirely consistent
with general antitrust policy and effective enforcement. The most
serious objection is that its use may vary with changes in administra-
tive personnel, depending on their view of the role of public bodies
in relation to private damage actions. This is an objection that may
ultimately require a legislative solution.° 4
63 Bicks, Antitrust Today, 1961 N.Y. State B.A. Antitrust Law Symposium 15,
19-20.
64 It has been reported that the House Judiciary Committee is studying the justifi-
cation for the absence of a prima facie effect in a nolo contendere plea. Lawyers Weekly
Report 2 (P-H Feb. 12, 1962).
On June 29, 1961, the Attorney General issued an order that all proposed consent
judgements in antitrust cases "be made public at least 30 days before they are entered
365
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
CONCLUSION
The asphalt clause, within the bounds of its presently anticipated
use, is an effective and desirable new weapon for enforcement of the
Sherman Act. Private treble damage actions have always been recog-
nized as an important link in the chain of antitrust effectiveness. The
use of the asphalt clause to aid states and municipalities in recovering
damages for antitrust violations is a logical sterngthening of this link.
Because of uncertainty in its use, however, further experience may
indicate the necessity of legislative standards governing its employ-
ment.
in court. The purpose was said to be to provide opportunity for comment or criticism
from persons or firms who are not parties to the action." 19 A.B.A. Antitrust Section 95
(1961): Legislation has been introduced in Congress which would make such publica-
tion mandatory. Id. at 209.
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